INTERMEDIATE FORMS OF ABSTRACTION/
BY TH. RIBOT.

HAVING

thus acquainted ourselves in the two previous Open
Courts with the factor of speech, which as an instrument of

abstraction

becomes

more and more important, we can
abstraction from the point at which we left

steadily

take up the subject of

In passing from the absence to the presence of the word, from
the lower to the intermediate forms of abstraction, we must again
it.

on our principal aim:

prove that abstraction and
generalisation are functions of the completely evolved mind. They
exist in embryo in perception, and in the image, and at their extreme limit involve suppression of all concrete representation.
This conclusion will hardly be contradicted. The difficulty is to
follow the evolution step by step, stage after stage, and to note the
difference by objective marks.
insist

viz.,

to

For intermediate abstraction, this operation is very simple. It
implies the use of words it has passed the level of prelinguistic
abstraction and generalisation.
We may go farther, and always
with the aid of words establish two classes within the total cate;

—

—

gory of mean abstraction
1. The lower forms, bordering on generic images, whose objective mark is the feeble participation of the word
it can indeed
be altogether foregone, and is only in the least degree an instru:

:

ment

of substitution.

2.

The higher

forms, approximating to the class of pure con-

mark the fact that words are
indispensable, since these have now become an instrument of substitution, though still accompanied by some sensory representa-

cepts,

and having as

their objective

tion.

1

Translated by Frances A. Welby.
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The legitimacy
comparison

tailed

of this division

two

of the

can be justified only by a de-

classes.

Before giving examples that determine the nature and intellectual trend of the lower forms, a theoretical question presents
itself

which cannot be eluded,

albeit

any profound discussion

belongs to the theory of cognition rather than to psychology.

of

it

It is

between generic images and the lowest concepts, one of nature or of degree ? This question has sometimes been propounded in a less general and more concrete form.
Is there any radical difference, any impassable gulf between animal
intelligence^ in its higher, and human intelligence in its lower aspects? Some authors give an absolute negation, others admit community of nature, and of transitional forms.
I shall first reject as inadmissible the argument that identifies
abstraction with the use of words.
Taine seems at times to admit
this:
"We think," he says, "the abstract characters of things by
means of the abstract names that are our abstract ideas, and the
formation of our ideas is no more than the formation of names
which are substitutes. "^ Clearly if abstraction is impossible withas follows

:

Is the difference

out words, this operation could only begin with speech.

was said

in

All that

previous articles proves the inanity of such an asser-

tion.

Let

order to discuss the question profitably,

us, in

sum up

the

principal characteristics of generic images on the one hand, of in-

concepts on the other.

ferior

Generic images are

:

(i)

simple and

of the practical order; (2)

the result of often-repeated experiences; (3) extracts from very salient resemblances; (4) a condensation into a visual, auditory, tactile,

They

or olfactory representation.

are the fruit of passive as-

similation.

The

them, which we are studying in the present instance, are in character .(i) less simple; (2)
less frequently repeated in experience; (3) they assume as material, similarities mingled with sufficiently numerous differences;
They are the fruit of active assimi(4) they are fixed by a word.

most akin

inferior concepts

to

:

lation.
It
1

may be

Intelligence

is

said that the
taken here in

its

two

classes,

when thus opposed

restricted sense, as the

synonym

ing, judging, reasoning.

'iDe

I' intelligence,

Vol.

I.,

Bk. IV., Chap,

i,

p. 254, first edition.

to

each

of abstracting, generalis-

;
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minimal differences, save for the addition of
For the moment, indeed, the word is only an instrument
words.
handled by a bad workman, who ignores its efficacy and highest
significance, as will be proved below.
But were it otherwise, and
were the delimitation between the two classes in no way fluctuating, the thesis of a progressive evolution must needs be given
up, unless it be admitted to begin only with the appearance of
other, present but

speech.^

Romanes

describes the passage from the generic image to the

concept as follows

:

"Waterfowl adopt

a

somewhat

different

mode

of

alighting

upon land, or even upon ice, from that which they adopt when
alighting upon water; and those kinds which dive from a height
These
(such as terns and gannets) never do so upon land or ice.
facts prove that these animals have onerecept answering to a solid
substance, and another answering to a fluid. Similarly, a man will
not dive from a height over hard ground, or over ice, nor will he
jump into water in the same way as he jumps upon land. In other
words, like the water-fowl, he has two distinct recepts, one of
which answers to solid ground, the other to an unresisting fluid.
But unlike the water-fowl, he is able to bestow upon each of these
recepts a name, and thus to raise them both to the level of concepts.
So far as the practical purposes of locomotion are concerned, it is, of course, immaterial whether or not he thus raises
his recepts into concepts; but, as we have seen, for many other
purposes it is of the highest importance that he is able to do this.
Now, in order to do it, he must be able to set his recept before his
own mind as an object of his own thought before he can bestow
upon these generic ideas the names of "solid "and "fluid," he
must have cognised them as ideas. Prior to this act of cognition,
these ideas differed in no respect from the recepts of a water fowl
neither for the requirements of his locomotion is it needful that
they should therefore, in so far as these requirements are concerned, the man makes no call upon his higher faculties of ideation.
But, in virtue of this act of cognition whereby he assigns a
name to an idea known as such, he has created for himself and
for purposes other than locomotion
a priceless possession he has
formed a concept."^
:

:

—

—

In point of fact, the transition

omits the intermediate stages
i

De

^

Mental Evolution

I'

intelligence,

I.,

in

Bk. IV., Chap,

Man,

i,

:

;

is

not so simple.

for with fluid

p. 254, first edition.

pp. 74 and 75.

and liquid

Romanes
we pene-
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more elevated order

concepts than those immediately bordering on the generic image.
What he well brings out is
that the bare introduction of words does not explain everything. It
must not be forgotten that if the higher development of the intelligence depends upon the higher development of speech, this last is
conditioned, not simply by the faculty of articulation, which exists
trate into a

among many
to

of

animals^ but by anterior cerebral conditions that have

be sought out.

For these, we must return to the distinction loosely established
above, between passive and active assimilation.
We know that
the fundamental mechanism of cognition may be reduced to two
antagonistic processes, association and dissociation, assimilation
and dissimilation to combine, to separate in brief, analysis and
synthesis.^
In the formation of the generic image, as we have
seen, assimilation plays the principal part
the mind works only
upon similarities. In proportion as we recede from this point, we
have the contrary; the mind works more and more upon differences; the primitive and essential operation is a dissociation; the
fusion of similarities only appears later.
The further back we go,
the more analysis preponderates, because we are pursuing resemblances more and more hidden by differences.
Coarser minds do
not rise above palpable similarities. The peasant who hears a dia;

;

;

lect or patois closely akin to his

another language to him

own understands nothing

of it;

it

whereas even a mediocre linguist immediately perceives the identity of words that differ only in accent.
We may represent the differences between generic images and
these general notions that most nearly approximate to them, by the
following symbol
is

;

:

I.

ABCde
ABCef
ABCgh,

where each

II.

Abcde

xyzAf
gAhkm,

etc.

etc.

corresponds to an object, and each letter to one of
the principal characters of the object.
Table I is that of the
generic image.
A part, ABC, is constantly repeated in each experience moreover, it is in relief, as indicated by the capitals the
line

;

;

elimination of differences

is

almost passive,

— self-caused;

they are

forgotten.

to

Table II is that of
be disengaged from

a fairly
all

simple general notion.

the objects in

lAs Paulhan remarks,

which

it is

A

has

included.

It

Here

1889, p. 26 et seq.),

" L'abstraction et les idees abstraites " [Revue Pkilosophique, ]&n.,
these two processes are initially linked one with the other, so that we find an-

alytical syntheses,

and synthetical analyses.

—
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has a salient character, indicated by capitals, and recurring in

each object but as it is merged in the differences, as it represents
but a poor fraction of the total event, it is not disengaged spontaneously; it exacts a preliminary labor of dissociation and elim;

ination.

Thus understood, the

between the two processes
consists only in the faculty of greater or less dissociation, and we
are in no way authorised in assuming a difference of nature.
But the question may be propounded in a different manner,
more precise and more embarrassing, I formulate it thus: the
generic image is never, the concept is always a judgment.
We
(formerly
any
the
know that for logicians
at
rate)
concept is the
element
next
comes the judgment, uniting
simple and primitive
two or several concepts then ratiocination, combining two or several judgments.
For the psychologist, on the contrary, affirmation
is the fundamental act
the concept is the result of judgments (ex.
difference

;

;

;

plicit or implicit), of similarities

in

addition to this

we

recall

commences with phrases

with exclusion of differences.

what was said above

:

If

that speech

form it is the
word-phrase then the debated question may be thus transformed
Is there, between the generic image and judgment in the lower
forms, a break in continuity, or a passage by slow transformation ?
For the partisans of the first theory, the appearance of judgonly, that in its simplest

:

;

"passage of the Rubicon" (Max Miiller). It is as impossible to deny this as to affirm it positively and indisputably.
Romanes, who makes a stand against the "passage of the Rubicon," admits the following stages in the development of signs, taken
as indicative of the development of intelligence itself.
1. The indicative sign;
gesture or pronominal root; a dog

ment

is

a

barking for a door to be opened, etc.
2. The denotative sign which is affixed to particular objects,
qualities, or actions
for example, the parrot which on seeing a
person utters the name of the person, or some word which it has
associated with him, and which for the animal has become the dis;

tinctive
3.

mark of the person.
The connotative or

wrongly,

mon

is

attributive

which,

sign,

rightly

or

attributed to an entire class of objects having a com-

quality; for instance, the child which applies the

word

star to

everything that shines.
4.

The denominative

the sign as such, with a

the word star in

its

sign; or the intentional

full

appreciation of

meaning

its

employment

value

to the astronomer.

;

for

of

example,

THE OPEN COURT.

354

predicative sign, or a proposition formed by the appo-

The

5.

two denominative signs.^
This hierarchical order, while

sition of

in

some measure open

to crit-

icism, indicates at least schematically the progressive passage from
the concrete to the higher abstractions, and may therefore be ac-

cepted.
It

clear that the

is

two

stages scarcely pass beyond the

first

concrete.

To

the third,

Romanes

attaches capital importance

:

judgment

may, however, be asked if affirmation really exFor my own part I am inclined to admit it as
ists at this stage.
included in the generic image in its highest degree (for here too
there are degrees), under the form not of a proposition, but of an acThe hunting dog assuredly possesses generic images of man
tion.
and of different kinds of game, under the visual and more espeWhen it starts off on the scent of its
cially the olfactory form.
master, of a hare, or of a partridge, this is surely a judgment of a
begins with

it.

It

certain kind, an affirmation, the least doubtful of

all,

seeing that

it

an act. The absence of verbal expression and of logical information in no way alters the fundamental nature of the mental state.
We have already spoken in a previous Open Court of practical
is

judgments and ratiocinations; it is needless to reiterate.
The transition from the third to the fourth stage is even more
here that the true concept appears this point atNow the true
tained, an almost unlimited progress is possible.
This formula apj)ears to us
cause of the true concept is reflexion.
important.

It is

;

the simplest, the briefest, the most clear, and the most exact.
There is the possibility of concepts where there is the possibility in

the

mind

of

from among
of raising

it

detaching a single character (or several), extracted
many others, of setting it up as an independent entity,
into a

known

object,

i.

e.,

with ourselves, and with other things.

But

eral idea of a vertebrate.

this

determined

Example

:

in its relations

to

fundamental act

form the gen-

— reflexion —

is

not without antecedents, it does not spring forth as a new appariIt is the highest degree of attention, i. e., of a mental attition.

down

animal scale.
Discontinuity of evolution, in the passage from lower to higher,
Doubtless this, like all other
is thus far from being established.
questions of genesis, leaves much to hypothesis, and can only be
tude that we encounter very low

in the

decided on probabilities yet these do not appear to favor a rupture in continuity, and opposition of nature.
:

\Op.

cit.,

VIII., 158-165.
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least contestable

:

given the cerebral and psychological conditions for speech (not for

and application of words to qualities
and attributes raised little by little into independent entities, and
the decisive step has been taken.
Such is intellectual progress,
and we may remark in passing that the process which creates the
true concept, leads fatally by the same issue to faith in idols, in the
articulate language alone),

—

entities realised.

Without for the moment pausing at this last point, let us under
a more positive form, and strictly on the lines of experimental psychology, examine the nature of the lower forms of intermediate abAt the same time we shall
straction, determining it by examples.
fix

the intellectual level that corresponds to the

moment

of transi-

between generic images (animal form), and the higher abThe best method
stracts which have still to be studied in detail.
is to take as a type such human races as have remained in the sav-

tion

age or half-civilised state: these are more instructive than childhood, because they represent fixed and permanent conditions. We

can draw on two principal sources their languages, and their systems of enumeration. Their religious beliefs might also be studied
with the same results, but this would take too long, and would
moreover be less definite.^
I.
The languages, considered under their most general characteristics, reveal a notable impotence for transcending the simplest
resemblances, an incurable incapacity for extended generalisathey hardly rise above the concrete. Words play a very intions
they are the most incomplete substitute hardly
distinct part
more than a mark, a sign, like gestures differing from the latter
The study of the asonly in the future they carry within them.
cending progress of generalisations is in effect the study of the successive phases of the emancipation of speech up to the time when
At the actual stage,
it becomes preponderant and dominating.
which might be termed concrete abstract, it is not yet emancipated
it is a minor, under tutelage.
Let us take in turn substantives, adjectives, and verbs.
The indigenes of Hawaii, says Max Miiller {^Lectures on the Science of Language, Second Series, II., p. 19), have but one word,
:

;

;

—

—

;

We

have touched on this subject incidentally in La psychologic lies sentiments (Part II., IX
seq ). Many tribes do not get beyond polydemonism, peopling the universe with
innumerable genii this is the reign of the concrete. A certain progress is marked by subordinating the genius of each tree to the god of the forest, the different genii of a river to the god of
the river, etc. At a degree higher, the intellect constitutes a single god for water, one for fire,
one for the earth, etc. Thus there come to be genii of individual, specific, and generic origin.
1

,

§ 2, pp. 305 et

;
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"aloba,"

express love, friendship, esteem, gratitude, benevo-

to

words to express variations in the
direction of the force of the wind are very numerous, proving once
more how at its origin abstraction or dissociation is governed by
lence, etc.; on the other hand,

In savage languages there are terms to express

practical causes.

not merely each species of dog, but their age, the color of their
there are
So, too, for the horse
hair, good or bad qualities, etc.
;

special words to designate

and

its varieties,

all its

movements

;

to

mounted, not mounted, frightened, running away,
and the like. The North American Indians have special words for
the black oak, the white oak, and the red oak, but none for the oak

indicate

it is

if

in general,

—

less for tree in general.

still

The indigenes

of Brazil

can point out the different parts of the body, but not the body as a
whole (Lubbock). Among several tribes of Oceania, a special
word is employed for the tail of a dog, another for the sheep's tail,

and so on, but they have no designation for tail in general. Again,
there is no common term for the cow, but there are distinct words
for red, white, or brown cows (Sayce).
There are, however, cases of very clear progress in generalisation
the significance of a word extends itself; from specific it becomes generic. This metamorphosis exists in vivo among the
Finns and Laplanders. The former have a name for the smallest
stream, and none for river; originally again there was a term for
each finger, none for finger in general but latterly the term used
;

;

for

thumb alone has come

Among

to designate the fingers collectively.

the second race, certain tribes

nation for each kind of bay, have
all

kinds

who had

a special

now adopted one

denomi-

that serves for

(Max MuUer).

The same holds good of the poverty of the adjective, the abThe case of the Tasmanians has often been
stract term proper.
quoted, how they could only express qualities by concrete representations

:

hard

= like

a stone; long

= legs;

round

= like a ball,

moon, etc. (Lubbock). A less familiar case, termed by
linguists " concretism," is met with even in certain more developed
idioms, like a survival of the time when the mind was unable to
detach itself from the concrete, or to forego a complete and de-

like the

tailed qualification.

the idiom

is

Instead of saying ten merchants, five hens,

merchants ten men, hens

five birds,

and so on

for sim-

ilar cases.

The verb

is

able to express

all

degrees of abstraction and of

generalisation as well as the adjective and substantive.
riod,

it

At this pe-

exactly repeats the type (as described above) of the sub-
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— for want of

a generali-

according to our judgment. The North
American Indians have special words for saying to wash one's
face, another person's face, the linen, utensils, etc.: in all, thirty
words, but none for washing in general. So, too, for eating bread,
sation simple enough,

:

fruits,

meat,

etc., striking

with the hand,

.

foot, axe, etc., for cut-

any other objects for all these there are special terms, but none for saying simply, to eat, to knock, to cut
(Sayce, Hovelacque). On the other hand, here is a case of transiCertain
tion, analogous to that of the Lapps and Finlanders.
tribes in Brazil have a few verbs of general, simple significance
eat, drink, dance, see, etc., even love, thank, etc. (Lubbock).
We need not multiply examples these will suffice to throw
into relief the extreme impotence in generalising, so soon as the
mind loses its hold on the concrete. We might also recall the difThey find it almost
ficulty so often experienced by missionaries.
impossible, even by creating new words, or by changing the meaning of others, to translate the sacred books into these idioms, from

ting wood, meat, or

:

:

;

their paucity of concrete terms.
T/ie niiine7-atio)i,

2.

taking

its

development as a whole, appears

to sub-divide into three principal periods

studied above, in animals and children

:

concrete numeration, as

concrete-abstract numer-

;

which we are now occupied purely abstract numerawhich we shall examine later, as translated into organised

ation, with
tion,

;

arithmetic.

We

have seen that speech at its origin was so humble as to
need gesture to complete and to elucidate it. During its concreteAt first
abstract period, numeration is in an analogous position.
it progresses slowly and painfully
its extension is very limited
from unity. Further, it can operate only when sustained by the
Counting is
concrete it must have a material accompaniment.
accomplished by the enunciation of words, with the aid of enumer:

;

ated objects, as perceived at the same time, or with that of the fingers
which, let it be remarked, is the first essay in substitution.
:

There

simultaneously concrete or digital, and verbal numera-

is

tion.^

We

know

that

many

Australian and South American tribes can

=

=

two-two
three
count verbally to two only; some say two-one
five,
four; others by the same process arrive at six (two-three
;

=

three-three

= six)

:

everything else

ITylor, Primitive Culture.

devoted

to

it.

I.,

is

"much." For

gives abundant data on this question.

the most part

Chap. VII.

is

entirely
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they count without words, with the aid of fingers or of articulation
even when they employ words, the two numerations digital and
verbal

;

—

— are performed simultaneously.^

This manner of counting is in first degree concrete the concrete-abstract form is only there in embryo.
A great advance,
made early enough in many tribes, consisted in counting by five,
taking the hand (five fingers) as a new unit, superior to the simple
unit.
Then: one hand
two hands or half a man
10
two
5
hands, one foot
20.
Such
15; two hands, two feet, or a man
is the evident origin of the quinary, decimal, and vigesimal numerations.
Sometimes fingers, as instruments of numeration, have
been replaced by objects of a typical number. Ex. i
moon or
sun 2
the eyes or legs, etc.
However varied these processes (of which only a few have
been mentioned) in different races and periods, they are fundamentally identical to the psychologist.
They may be reduced to this
numeration is performed more particularly with the aids of sensible
perceptions words are but an insignificant accompaniment, a su;

=

=

;

=

^

:

=

;

;

=

;

;

perfluity

— existing

only as a proliferation

-of so little utility that

they are for the most part neglected.

spoken of, we may remark that the
measure of continuous quantity passed through the same concreteabstract phase
and here it appeared at a somewhat early stage,
owing to practical and social wants. Hence we find at the outset

Though

is

it

less often

;

the foot, the

finger,

the

thumb (inch=Fr.

pouce), the palestra

(four fingers' length), span, cubit (arm's reach
etc.,

the stadium (distance a good

stopping).^
1

says

:

The concrete

In the account of his travels
" In practice, whatever they

=

r<?«^/^),

fathom,

runner could cover without

character of

all

these measures

is

obvi-

among the Datnaras {Tropical South Africa, p. 133) Galton
may possess in their language, they certainly use no numeral

When

they wish to express four, they take to their fingers, which are to them
is to our English schoolboy.
They puzzle very much after five, because no spare hand remains to grasp and secure the fingers that are
required for units,' yet they seldom lose oxen the way in which they discover the loss of one,

greater than three.

as formidable instruments of calculation as a sliding-rule

'

—

:

not by the number of the herd being diminished, but by the absence of a face they know."
[This tallies with what we have already said as to so-called numeration in animals and chil" When bartering is going on, each sheep must be paid for separately. Thus suppose
dren.]
two sticks of tobacco to be the rate of exchange for one sheep, it would sorely puzzle* a Damara
to take two sheep and give him four sticks.
I have done so and seen a man first put two of the
sticks apart and take a sight over them at one of the sheep he was about to sell. Having satisfied
himself that one was honestly paid for, and finding to his surprise that exactly two sticks remained in hand to settle the account for the other sheep, he would be afflicted with doubts the
transaction seemed to come out too pat to be correct, and he would refer back to the first couple
of sticks, and then his mind got hazy and confused, and wandered from one sheep to the other,
and he broke off the transaction until two sticks were put into his hand and one sheep driven
is

;

away, and then the other two sticks given him and the second sheep driven away."
lates many other similar facts which he had himself witnessed.
2

And

the barley-corn of English measure.

— TV.

Galton

re-
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Again, there are survivals

as a day's journey.
ter, their

More than

in certain

this

;

current locutions, such

they have a

standard and starting-point being,

certain parts of the body, or a determined
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human

charac-

at least at the outset,

sum

of

muscular move-

by little they lost their original significance, progressing through centuries towards our metrical system
the type

ments.

Little

—

of a scientific, deliberate, rationally abstract system, as far as pos-

from anthropomorphism.
The reader will probably obtain a more definite idea of the nature of these lower forms by recapitulating the examples cited, than
from any long dissertation. Is their intellectual level very superior
At times
to that of the generic image ? This question is doubtful.
at
the only distinction between them is the presence of the word
the present stage it makes but a poor figure,
yet with all its modesty, it augurs a new world wherein it is to be of prime impor-

sible liberated

:

—

tance.

